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NOTES
to them.18 In dealing with the punctuation of the exclusionary
provision the court was squarely faced with conflicting expert
testimony. However, by accepting the opinion that the three
phrases of the provision were equal members of a series, each
taking the same object, the court applied a well-known rule of
English grammar, 19 and the only case which held to the contrary
was disregarded. 20  The court's interpretation of the "Drive
Other Cars" clause is in accord with the apparent purpose of such
a clause; for though the clause was intended to extend some
coverage to an insured when driving another automobile, it is
questionable that the insurer desired to allow the insured, be-
cause of the intimacy of his family, to drive automobiles always
available to him and still be covered. 21
In October of 1956, the Louisiana State Insurance Commis-
sion approved a new policy known as the Family Combination
Automobile Policy. The older Standard Automobile Combina-
tion Policy may now be converted to this new policy in accord-
ance with certain regulations of the commission. Although the
new Family Combination Automobile Policy contains no "Drive
Other Cars" clause, it provides the same type of coverage. 22
Though the new policy probably extends broader coverage than
the old one in some areas, the same result would have been
reached had the instant case arisen under it.2s Thus, by a dele-
tion of possible misleading words, the insurance companies have
achieved a clearer statement of the accepted purpose of the older
policies' "Drive Other Cars" clause.
H. 0. Lestage, III
OBLIGATIONS - QUANTUM MERUIT
Plaintiff, the owner of two adjoining buildings, authorized
defendant, lessee of one building, to store goods temporarily in
18. Seguin v. Continental Service Life & Health Ins. Co., 230 La. 533, 89
So.2d 113 (1956); McKinney v. American Security Life Ins. Co., 76 So.2d 630(La. App. 1954); Beard v. Peoples Industrial Life Ins. Co., 5 So.2d 340 (La.
App. 1941).
19. FORESTER & STEADMAN, WRITING AND THINKING 170, Rule 18c (1941 ed.);
HODGES, HARBRACE COLLEGE HANDBOOK 129, Rule 13d.
20. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pray, 204 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1953).
21. Fleming v. Travelers Ins. Co., 206 Miss. 284, 39 So.2d 885 (1949).
22. This coverage is provided by the "Persons Insured" clause in light of the
definition of the terms "non-owned automobile" and "relative."
23. In the new policy a "non-owned automobile" is defined as one not owned
by the named insured or any relative. "Relative" is defined in the policy as a
relative who is a resident of the same household. Thus, since the car in the instant
case was owned by a relative of the named insured within the definitions of the
new policy, the automobile could not be considered a "non-owned automobile" and
the named insured would not have been covered while driving it.
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the other building rent free. After defendant had so used the
second building for about a week, plaintiff sent a letter1 inform-
ing defendant that he would either have to remove his goods or
pay rent of $200 per month or $10 per day. Defendant made no
reply to the letter and continued to store goods in the second
building until he was evicted. The lower court allowed plaintiff
to recover rent of $200 per month, apparently on quantum
meruit. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Orleans, held, af-
firmed. However, the court held that a contract had been formed
by defendant's failure to respond to plaintiff's offer. Robert
Werk & Co. v. Shirer, 91 So.2d 110 (La. App. 1956).
At common law the count in general assumpsit known as
quantum meruit, which means "as much as he deserved,"'2 al-
leged a promise to pay the reasonable value of services rendered. 8
Recovery on the basis of quantum meruit has been liberally al-
lowed to prevent unjust enrichment and when an obligation to
pay a debt of uncertain amount 4 has arisen under a contract. 5
Thus recovery of reasonable value may be granted in lieu of
damages ;6 when a contract contains no provision for the specific
1. Letter sent from plaintiff to defendant: "We are writing you this letter to
clarify the present situation and avoid future misunderstandings.
"On or about the 28th or 29th of October the writer agreed to let you use a
limited portion of the building, 3505 Gravier St., adjoining the building you leased
from us. This limited use was understood to be for only a few days.
"You have at this writing violated our understanding both in extent of use
and time. Not to cause you undue hardship, we will not insist on you vacating
the premises, as per our understanding above, but if you continue -to occupy the
premises we will charge you rent as follows: Two hundred dollars per month or
Ten dollars per day. We reserve the right to immediate possession." Robert Werk
& Co. v. Shirer, 91 So.2d 110, 112 (La. App. 1956).
2. BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914).
3. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 20 (1950)
SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 167 (3d ed. 1923).
4. When a sum certain money debt is created by the performance under a con-
tract between the parties -that sum is due and no other sum may be recovered.
Dermott v. Jones, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 1 (1864) ; Dibol v. Minott, 9 Iowa 403
(1859) ; Lynch v. Stebbins, 127 Me. 203, 142 Atl. 735 (1928) ; Rodemer v. Gonder,
Hazlehurst & Co., 9 Gill 288 (Md. 1850) ; 5 CORnIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1109, 1111
(1950) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 350-351 (1932).
5. Professor Winfield lists three categories in which quantum meruit may be
used: (1) when one party to a contract has committed a breach, and the other
seeks reasonable remuneration for performance rendered rather than damages;
(2) where a new contract is impliedly substituted for the original contract; (3)
as a rule of law calling for reasonable remuneration where a contract does not
fix a compensation to be paid for work rendered under it. He further states that
the first category is quasi-contractual in nature and the latter two contractual.
WINFIELD, THE LAW OF TORT 157-60 (1931). In a later book Professor Winfield
divides the first category into three classifications. WINFIELD, THE LAW OF QUASI-
CONTRACT 51-60 (1952).
6. Quantum meruit may be used as an alternate remedy to damages in cases
of breach of contract. Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin Paper Co., 57 Ohio St. 182,
48 N.E. 888 (1897) ; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1104 (1950) ; WINFIELD, THE LAW
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amount of compensation ;7 when there is an impliedly substituted
contract;8 when the plaintiff himself falls short of substantial
performance9 yet seeks recovery because the other party has
been enriched due to his efforts ;1o or generally, any time a quasi-
contractual obligation to pay for services rendered arises."1
The idea of a quantum meruit recovery seems to have first
appeared in Louisiana in 1820.12 Since that time its use has fol-
OF QUASI-CONTRACTS 51-52 (1952); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 384(1), 326
(1932).
The two are quite different because in theory, at least, an award of damages
is the method of placing the plaintiff in the position that he would have been in
if the contract had been fully performed, while a recovery based on quantum reruit
restores to plaintiff the value of his services. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1102,
1107 (1950) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 347, Comment (b) (1932).
Thus, when a defendant breaches a contract a quantum meruit recovery may be
had. Chicago v. Tilley, 103 U.S. 146 (1880) ; Spitalny v. Tanner Const. Co., 75
Ariz. 192, 254 P.2d 440 (1953) ; Mooney v. York Iron Co., 82 Mich. 355, 46 N.W.
376 (1890) ; Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. Athletic Bldg. Assn., 297 Mo.
615, 249 S.W. 922 (1922) ; Burton v. Ross, 251 S.W. 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ;
5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1109 (1950) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 381 (1932).
This recovery, because of its restitution derivation as mentioned above, is not
necessarily limited by the contract price. Schwasnick v. Blandin, 65 F.2d 354 (2d
Cir. 1933) ; Hemminger v. Western Assurance Co., 95 Mich. 355, 54 N.W. 949
(1893); Derby v. Johnson, 21 Vt. 17 (1848) ; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1112-1113
(1950); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 347 (1932).
7. Contracts which left the value of the services open. Schmetzer v. Broegler,
92 N.J.L. 88, 105 AtI. 450 (1918) ; King v. Broadhurst, 150 N.Y. Supp. 376, 164
App. Div. 689 (1914).
Contracts expressly stating that a fair and reasonable price is to be paid.
Foster v. Young, 172 Cal. 317, 156 Pac. 476 (1916) ; Nave v. Taugher, 49 Cal.
App. 308, 193 Pac. 508 (1920) ; Jewry v. Busk, 5 Taugh. 302, 128 Eng. Reprint
706 (1814).
8. This naturally would mean that some performance other than the perform-
ance called for in the contract was rendered by plaintiff and received by defend-
ant - for instance, extra work might be done outside the contract for the reason-
able value of which defendant would be liable. Ruttle v. Foss, 161 Mich. 132, 125
N.W. 790 (1910) ; Snyder v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 163 Pa. Super. 528 (1916).
9. "The term means that there has been no willful departure from the terms
of the contract, and no omission of any of its essential parts, and that the con-
tractor has in good faith performed all of its substantive terms .... There must
be such an approximation to complete performance that the owner obtains sub-
stantially what was called for by the contract, although it may not be the same in
every particular, and although there may be omissions and imperfections on ac-
count of which there should be a deduction from the contract price." BALLENTINE,
LAw DICTIONARY 1246 (2d ed. 1948). 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 700-07 (1950);
SHUMAKER & LOUGSDORF, CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (1940).
10. Allen v. McKibbin, 5 Mich. 449 (1858) ; Francoeur v. Stephen, 97 N.H.
80, 81 A.2d 308 (1951); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1124-1127 (1950); RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 357 (1932). However, recovery is usually denied if the breach
is willful on plaintiff's part. Harris v. The Cecil N. Bean, 197 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.
1952) ; Mallory v. Mackaye, 92 Fed. 749 (2d Cir. 1899) ; Callehan v. Stafford, 18
La. Ann. 556 (1866). Contra: Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834). But see
5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1122-1123 (1950) as to what constitutes a willful breach.
11. Thompson v. Reed, 48 Ill. 118 (1868) ; Raymond v. Eldridge, 111 Mass.
390 (1873) ; Smith v. Milligan, 43 Pa. St. 107 (1862) ; SiIIPMAN, COMMON LAW
PLEADING 14-15, 19-20, 34 (1895).
12. The quantum meruit concept first appeared in Louisiana jurisprudence in
the form of quantum valebant, which deals with the value of goods sold rather than
the value for services rendered. Gilly v. Henry, 8 Mart.(O.S.) 402 (La. 1820).
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lowed, in the main, the common law development.13 Actually it
appears to be little more than a label to cover a claim or judg-
ment for the reasonable value of services rendered. 14 Procedur-
ally Louisiana courts have applied the rule that quantum meruit
recovery may not be granted in cases where plaintiff prays for
a sum specified in a contract but fails to prove the agreement
for compensation as alleged. 15 In such a case the filing of a sep-
arate suit based on a quantum meruit theory is necessary. The
cautious pleader, however, may avoid this difficulty by pleading
in the alternative. 16
In the instant case plaintiff apparently sought recovery of
rent on the basis of an alleged contract fixing the amount due.
The trial court did not find that a contract of lease had been
proved but allowed recovery of " '$873.33 4 month 11 days at
200 per mo. on quantum meruit No relationship of landlord &
Tenant.'" 7 (Emphasis added.) In consequence, defendant argued
on appeal that a quantum meruit recovery could not be allowed
13. Duncan v. Blackman, 3 La. App. 421, 423 (1926), sets out the following,
which seems to be a good general rule: "In order for plaintiff to recover judgment
against defendant on a quantum meruit it must appear that there was a contract
express or implied between them or that his services inured to her benefit; and
in the absence of any obligation under a contract or quasi-contract, . . . whereby
defendant became indebted to plaintiff he is not entitled to judgment for the value
of the work done or services rendered by him in connection with the plans and
specifications."
Recoveries have been allowed in the following cases: The Town & Country
Contractors v. Henderson, 231 La. 131, 90 So.2d 863 (1956) (plaintiff breached -
recovery allowed under Civil Code Article 1965) ; H. A. Bauman, Inc. v. Tilly,
185 So. 504 (La. App. 1938) (quasi-contract) ; Friede v. Myles Salt Co., 177 So.
105 (La. App. 1937) (contract with no set compensation) ; Condran v. New
Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 1202, 9 So. 31 (1891) (unenforceable contract) ; Dunbar
v. Butler, 2 Rob. 32 (La. 1842) (substituted contract) ; Joublanc v. Daunoy, 6
La. 656 (1834) (defendant breached) ; Moran v. Wallace & Co., Man. Unrep. Cas.
183 (impossible to perform required services).
It would appear that it is possible to have a quantum meruit recovery greater
than a contract price where the circumstances warrant it. Joublanc v. Daunoy, 6
La. 656 (1834) ; Villalobos v. Mooney, 2 La. 331 (1831).
14. Quantum meruit naturally connotes the reasonable value theme so it is
shorter to say quantum meruit rather than stating a plea for reasonable value;
then, too, it is in Latin. The actual need for quantum meruit in Louisiana law is
doubtful in that there seems to be adequate provisions in the Civil Code to handle
any such cases. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 21, 1928, 1935(3), 1965, 2292, 2293
et seq., 2295 et seq., 2765 (1870).
15. Condran v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 1202, 9 So. 31 (1891) ; Bright v.
Metairie Cemetery Ass'n, 33 La. Ann. 58 (1881) ; Miller v. Krouse, 177 So. 472
(La. App. 1937). A like rule is recognized in the common law: McCormick v.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 114 Mo. App. 460, 89 S.W. 905 (1905) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS §381 (1932).16. The cautious method would be for plaintiff to pray first on the con-
tractual price and alternatively, if the contract be not proven, that verdict be
granted on a quantum reruit basis. Barnes v. Saia, 56 So.2d 436 (La. App. 1952).
For the common law see 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1110 (1950) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 381, Comment (b), and § 384, Comment (b) (1932).17. Robert Werk & Co. v. Shirer, 91 So.2d 110, 114 (La. App. 1957).
NOTES
since plaintiff had sought recovery on a contract,18 which he had
failed to prove. Although the court of appeal found that the
facts "evidenced conclusively an implied consent to the terms
of the letter of November 4th,"' 9 it disposed of defendant's con-
tention by saying, "Certainly we cannot say from these facts
that plaintiff has based its recovery on an alleged cohtract and
therefore cannot recover on a quantum meruit basis. '20
Pretermitting consideration of the inconsistency suggested
by the positions of the lower and appellate courts, the case pre-
sents the question of whether contractual rather than quasi-
contractual recovery was justified on the facts. The court, ap-
parently relying on Articles 2293, 2294, and 1816,21 as well as
certain prior decisions 2 2 indicated it was not necessary to dis-
tinguish between the two. A quasi-contractual obligation is im-
posed by the law "without any agreement, ' 23 while a contractual
obligation rests on agreement or consent.24 The existence of a
contract would depend upon whether defendant had consented
to the proposal contained in the letter of November 4th.25 In
view of the fact that he made no reply, consent would have to be
inferred from his silence or his actions, or both. The court ap-
parently found that his continued occupancy, after receipt of
the letter, constitutes such consent, by virtue of Article 1816.26
Common law authorities support the principle that a contract
cannot be thrust upon a party in consequence of his mere
18. It would seem that plaintiff alleged the facts, price, etc., which led to the
finding of a contract and then merely asked for judgment, rather than specifically
stating that he wished to recover on the contract. Likewise, he must not have
included in his prayer any request for recovery based entirely on reasonable value,
i.e., quantum meruit.
19. Robert Werk & Co. v. Shirer, 91 So.2d 110, 114 (La. App. 1956).
20. Ibid.
21. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
22. Lowy v. Bulliard, 17 So.2d 855 (La. App. 1944) ; Masera v. Rosedale Inn,
1 So.2d 160 (La. App. 1941); Hearne v. De Generes, 144 So. 194 (La. App.
1932).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2294 (1870).
24. Id. at art. 1179.
25. This was one of the distinguishing features cited by the court in its dis-
cussion of the case of Hearne v. De Generes, 144 So. 194 (La. App. 1932), be-
cause in that case a protest was immediately sent, thus excluding any consent and
leaving only quasi-contractual possibilities.
26. La. Civil Code (1870). Had the court deemed it necessary it could have
drawn on a wealth of further support. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1811, 1816, 1817,
1818 (1870) ; Elfant v. Trahan, 156 La. 220, 100 So. 404 (1924); Shreveport
Traction Co. v. Mulhaupt, 122 La. 667, 48 So. 144 (1908) ; Boyd v. Heine, 41
La. Ann. 393, 6 So. 714 (1889) ; Baker v. Stoutmeyer & Co., 2 MeGloin 61 (La.
1884) ; Balch v. Young, 23 La. Ann. 272 (1871) ; Camfrancq v. Pilie, 1 La. Ann.
197 (1848); Adle v. Metoyer, 1 La. Ann. 254 (1846); Beach v. McDonough, 5
Rob. 352 (La. 1843) ; Amory v. Black, 13 La. 264 (1839) ; Stubner v. Raymond,
17 La. App. 216, 135 So. 676 (1931).
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silence.27 However, in cases in which a party continues to occupy
property after being advised that there will be a charge if he
continues to do so, his silence is counted as an acceptance of the
terms contained in the notification.28 Justification for this view
lies in the fact that there is more than mere silence involved;
there is a continued possession of property with knowledge of
the terms on which it may be retained. Although the facts in
such a case are not the same as where a tacit reconduction 29
occurs by the lessee's continued occupancy of the leased property
after expiration of a lease, the inference is perhaps just as
strong. Hence, in the instant case a finding of implied consent
based on silence plus continued possession of the property would
seem to have been justified.
It appears that under the jurisprudence30 defendant's posi-
tion that a quantum meruit recovery was not in order might
well have had merit. Whether the court of appeal actually based
its decision on an implied contract or on quantum meruit is not
entirely clear. However, it does seem that the court was unwill-
ing to deny plaintiff substantive relief by submitting him to the
rigors of a rather harsh procedural rule. The difficulties pre-
sented by the instant case will be avoided under the proposed
draft of the Revised Code of Practice, which contains a provi-
sion rejecting the old "theory of a case" doctrine3l by allowing
a plaintiff recovery in the original action when he has shown a
right thereto,32 rather than requiring him to file a second suit.
27. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 73 (1950) (cases cited therein); RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 72 (1932).
28. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 75 (1950) (cases cited therein); RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 72 (1932).
29. LA CIVIT. CODE arts. 2688-2689 (1870).
30. The jurisprudence seems quite clear to the effect that when a contract,
with a set compensation, is proved there can be no quantum meruit or reasonable
value recovery, so long as that contract has been so completed as to set up a sum
certain money debt. Therefore, even if plaintiff did not allege entirely upon the
contract a quantum meruit recovery would not seem to be in order. Hogan v.
Gibson, 12 La. 457 (1838) ; Willis v. Melville, 19 La. Ann. 13 (1867). See note 4
supra.
And indeed if plaintiff alleged entirely on the contract the district court's
quantum moruit recovery was not in order. Condran v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann.
1202, 9 So.2d 31 (1891). See note 15 supra.
31. "It is an established rule of pleading that a complainant must proceed on
some definite theory, and on that theory the plaintiff must succeed, or not suc-
ceed at all. A complaint cannot be made elastic so as to take form with the vary-
ing views of counsel." Mescall v. Tully, 91 Ind. 96, 99 (1883). See Hubert, The
Theory of a Case in Louisiana, 24 TUL. L. REV. 66 (1949).
32. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF PRACTICE REVISION, bk.
I, tit. I, art. 8, reads as follows: "Relief granted under pleadings; sufficiency
of prayer.
"Every final judgment, except one rendered by default, shall grant the relief
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has
[Vol. XVIII
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Under this provision of the proposed code a plaintiff is not
restricted to the relief specifically prayed for; in this manner
the same result would be achieved without imposing an unneces-
sary delay on the judicial recognition of plaintiff's substantive
rights.
Ray Carlton Muirhead
TAXATION - ACCOUNTING FOR PREPAID INCOME
The Automobile Club of Michigan furnishes road and map
services to its members in accordance with one-year membership
contracts, the dues for which are paid in advance. When re-
ceived, the dues are credited to a liability account entitled "Un-
earned Membership Dues," and monthly thereafter one-twelfth
of this amount is transferred to an income account designated
"Membership Income." The Commissioner rejected the taxpay-
er's method of accounting and held that all membership dues are
taxable in the year received.' The Tax Court sustained the Com-
missioner on the grounds that the dues must be reported in the
year received in order to reflect income clearly. 2 On appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, held, affirmed be-
cause money received under a "claim of right" is taxable income
in the year received.3 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. The taxpayer's method of accounting failed to reflect
income clearly. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner,
1 L. Ed. 746 (U.S. 1957).
It is within the intendment of the income tax laws that each
taxpayer should compute his tax liability in accordance with the
method of accounting which he regularly employs. 4 Section 42
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 expressly states that in
not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for
general and equitable relief. A judgment by default shall not grant greater relief
than that prayed for in the petition."
1. Acting in 1945 the Commissioner revoked his 1934 and 1938 rulings which:
had exempted the taxpayer from federal income taxes and applied the revoca-
tion retroactively to the years 1943 and 1944.
2. Automobile Club of Michigan, 20 T.C. 1033, 1047 (1953) : "Since the entire
amount of membership dues was income for the year in which received and since
the petitioner's method of accounting for income did not take cognizance of the
full amount thereof in such year, it is apparent that the petitioner's method of
accounting did not clearly reflect its income."
3. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 585 (6th Cir.
1956).
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 41; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.41-43: "It is recog-
nized that no uniform method of accounting can be prescribed for all taxpayers,
and the law contemplates that each taxpayer shall adopt such forms and systems
of accounting as are in his judgment best suited to his purposes."
1957] 215
